Chinese military analysts are shifting their focus from the theoretical possibility of jamming Starlink to the practical challenge of doing so during a real conflict over Taiwan. The task is immense: Taiwan and its partners could draw on a network of more than 10,000 satellites capable of rapidly changing frequencies, rerouting traffic, and actively resisting interference. Yet a recent simulation by Chinese researchers offers the most detailed assessment so far of how a countermeasure might work. Published on November 5 in the peer-reviewed journal Systems Engineering and Electronics, the study concludes that disrupting Starlink over an area the size of Taiwan is feasible—though it would demand an enormous electronic warfare (EW) force.

Figure 1. Starlink Jamming.

Constantly shifting Starlink network complicates jamming efforts

Rather than treating Starlink as a stationary system, the study highlights that its constantly changing orbital geometry is the true challenge. Led by a team from Zhejiang University and the Beijing Institute of Technology, the researchers note that satellites are continuously moving across the sky, appearing and disappearing from ground view in rapid succession. Figure 1 shows Starlink Jamming.

This fluid motion creates major uncertainty for any military attempt to track or jam Starlink signals. As reported by the South China Morning Post, unlike older satellite systems tied to a small number of fixed geostationary satellites, Starlink behaves nothing like a stationary target [1]. Traditional satellite networks can be jammed by overpowering their signal from the ground. Starlink’s low-orbit, high-speed satellites operate in massive numbers, and each user terminal rapidly switches between several satellites, forming a constantly shifting communication mesh. Even if one link is blocked, the signal can reroute almost instantly—making sustained disruption extremely difficult.

Swarms of jamming drones seen as the only viable solution

The research team led by Yang suggests that the only workable method would be a decentralized approach: a large swarm of synchronized airborne jammers rather than a few powerful ground-based systems. These jammers—carried on drones, balloons, or aircraft—would need to work together to create a broad electromagnetic shield over the battlefield.

The simulation examined different jamming power levels and antenna configurations, comparing wide-beam antennas that spread energy over large areas with narrow-beam antennas that direct higher power at smaller targets. For each location, the model calculated whether a Starlink terminal could still operate.

According to the findings, completely suppressing Starlink across Taiwan’s 13,900-square-mile area would require at least 935 synchronized jamming platforms, even without accounting for equipment failures, terrain obstacles, or future Starlink upgrades. Using lower-power 23 dBW systems spaced roughly three miles apart would increase the number to about 2,000 airborne units. The authors caution that these figures are preliminary, as many of Starlink’s anti-jamming technologies remain undisclosed.

Reference:

1. https://interestingengineering.com/military/china-simulates-jamming-starlink-over-taiwan

Cite this article:

Keerthana S (2025), China Tests Starlink Jamming Tactics Over Taiwan, Deploying 1,000+ Drones, AnaTechMaz, pp.243